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PARTY IN THE PANDEMIC: THE EFFECTS OF PARTISAN BIASES ON 
EVALUATIONS OF PRESIDENT TRUMP’S RESPONSE TO COVID-19 
ANTHONY AGUIRRE 
ABSTRACT 
 With over 550,000 American lives claimed by COVID-19, over 30 million 
confirmed infections, and historic job losses across the nation, evaluations of the 
pandemic response from the Trump Administration have been polarizing. In the eyes of 
many Americans, President Trump’s Coronavirus response has been lacking in swiftness 
and efficacy, while many others see the governmental response as competent or having 
exceeded expectations. In light of previous research, to expect these evaluations to be 
politically polarized would be reasonable, but at what point do these partisan biases fall 
away? This survey study will test how partisan biases influence Americans’ evaluations 
of President Donald Trump’s – and President Biden’s – handling of the Coronavirus 
pandemic response – factoring in how respondents have been personally affected by the 
pandemic or personally know someone who has been. These experiences with COVID-19 
will be quantified by proximity to loss of life due to, and infection of, COVID-19, as well 
as job loss as a result of the effects of the virus. As devastating as these experiences may 
be, I expect the influence of partisan biases to be overwhelmingly correlated with 
respondents’ evaluations of both President Trump’s and President Biden’s COVID-19 
response when compared to the correlation of personal experience. As the findings will 
suggest, these expectations prove to be accurate; Republicans indicate substantially 
higher levels of satisfaction with President Trump’s pandemic response when compared 
 
 viii 
to Democrats, with the reverse relationship observed for evaluations of President Biden, 
and this holds true at all levels of proximity. Further, partisan identity yields a 
considerably larger magnitude of correlation with these evaluations when compared to 
personal experience. Unfortunately, Americans do not seem to hold their presidents 
accountable for their actions (or inaction) by learning from even the most traumatic 
experiences; party overpowers all else. The findings of this study will greatly enrich the 
current literature on the extent to which partisan biases influence evaluations of 
government, and will provide insight into the reliability of democratic accountability, 
and, resultantly, the very functioning of American democracy.  
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1. Cognitive Dissonance 
In politics – just as in economics, medicine, and other fields – there are objective 
truths. It is an indisputable fact, say, that the Dow Jones Industrial Average has increased 
or decreased by a certain amount on a given day, or that the United States has spent 
billions of dollars on its military in a given year. Party members, both elites and everyday 
voters, however, often will interpret these objective truths in wildly different ways – or, 
as we have observed seemingly more and more often in recent years, may dispute the 
very legitimacy of these truths to begin with. 
 The root cause of such differences in opinions may be as psychological as it is 
political. In his seminal work, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957), Leon Festinger 
argues that, on the whole, people tend to have internally consistent beliefs, and that what 
we believe tends to be strongly correlated with the actions we take. 
“A person who believes a college education is a good thing will very 
likely encourage his children to go to college; a child who knows he 
will be severely punished for some misdemeanor will not commit it or 
at least will not try to be caught doing it” (1). 
 However, says Festinger, some of our beliefs may be contradictory. Critically, 
individuals “rarely, if ever” accept this inconsistency, and instead, efforts often will be 
made to rationalize the validity of these rogue beliefs. 
“The person who continues to smoke, knowing that it is bad for his 
health, may also feel (a) he enjoys smoking so much it is worth it; (b) 
the chances of his health suffering are not as serious as some would 




contingency and still live; and (d) perhaps even if he stopped smoking 
he would put on weight which is equally bad for his health. So, 
continuing to smoke is, after all, consistent with his ideas about 
smoking” (2). 
 These attempts to rationalize the irrational are motivated by a desire for “internal 
consistency,” in which none of one’s beliefs are in conflict with another (Elliot & Devine 
1994). Failure to achieve this universal consistency results in cognitive dissonance, a 
state of psychological discomfort that arises when an individual becomes acutely aware 
of an inconsistency among their beliefs. To overcome this uneasy psychological state, an 
individual will engage in “dissonance reduction,” in which they will: (1) change: change 
or adapt one’s beliefs to resolve the dissonance, (2) research: gain additional information 
that will outweigh one of the dissonant beliefs, and/or take the easiest approach and (3) 
minimize: diminish or downplay the importance of dissonant beliefs (Festinger 1957). 
Using the aforementioned smoker example, this may involve the smoker (1) accepting 
that smoking is bad for their health, and working to quit, an uncommon outcome; (2) 
using non-medical sources found on social media to gain “evidence” that smoking is not 
bad for one’s health; or (3) downplaying the health effects of smoking altogether. 
2. Motivated Reasoning 
Political partisans, more of than not, act no differently than Festinger’s smoker, 
opting to justify and reinforce pre-existing beliefs via biased researching and minimizing 
rather than changing beliefs in response to new information. Many political scientists 
have long attributed the above phenomena to motivated reasoning, a psychological 




conscious or unconscious – of interpreting information in a way that favors one’s 
preferred political party and/or disfavors the opposition. Extensive existing literature has 
indicated that the way in which people process new political information – even 
conflicting information – is biased in favor of their prior positions (Taber and Lodge 
2006; Lodge and Taber 2013; Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012), and, in the event 
that a person seeks out additional information to better inform their opinions, this 
information search is often motivated by a desire to confirm existing beliefs, rather than 
challenge them (Lodge, Taber, and Galonsky 1999). 
Motivated reasoning has manifested itself in seemingly innocuous ways, such as 
The Washington Post’s 2017 survey experiment in which Trump supporters were 
overwhelmingly more likely than Clinton supporters to incorrectly identify a photo of 
former President Obama’s 2009 inauguration crowd as being that of former President 
Trump’s 2017 crowd1 (Schaffner and Luks 2017), but has also seen more consequential 
appearances in past research, such as the marked differences between Republicans and 
Democrats regarding both the existence and severity of climate change2 (Rutjens, Sutton, 
and Lee 2017), as well as trust in scientists and experts (Hamilton, Hartter, and Saito 
2015; Oliver and Rahn 2016).  
The above scenarios point to instances in which (1) there is an objective truth (i.e. 
Obama’s inauguration crowd was larger, climate change is both real and serious, etc.) 
and, critically, (2) members and/or leaders of one or both political parties have taken 
                                                        
1 Trump supporters were also more much more likely to incorrectly identify which of the two photos 
featured more people, with 15% of Trump supporter respondents doing so, as opposed to 2% of Clinton 
supporters and 3% of nonvoters. 




public stances regarding the issues, providing political messaging. Famously, in response 
to ridicule from major media outlets regarding former President Trump’s inauguration 
crowd size, former White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer stated: “Photographs of the 
inaugural proceedings were intentionally framed in a way…to minimize the enormous 
support that had gathered on the National Mall…This was the largest audience to ever 
witness an inauguration, period, both in person and around the globe” (CNN 2017). With 
regards to climate science, prominent Republican leaders, including former President 
Trump, have repeatedly questioned its legitimacy – a skepticism that has extended 
towards relevant epidemiological studies in the COVID-19 era (Lemire et al 2020). 
Evidence has suggested that such political messaging has a trickle-down effect to 
party supporters. Some scholars have attributed the truly dramatic shifts in public opinion 
seen in recent years in favor of gay marriage and in opposition to the death penalty, for 
example, to rhetoric from political elites (Baumgartner et al 2008, Baunach 2012). 
Others, including Broockman and Butler (2015), found that voters would tend to adopt 
positions that their political representatives took, even if those legislators did not provide 
justification for their policy positions. Once again in the realm of climate science, 
researcher Riley Dunlap (2014) contends that rhetoric from GOP leaders has directly 
promoted “distrust in climate science and other environmental sciences, and 
environmental skepticism in general, among lay conservatives who take their cues from 
trusted political leaders” (2). 
 The effects of such partisan political messaging in an era of COVID-19 have 




that partisan politics has played a dramatic role in Americans’ interpretations of the 
severity of the virus and pandemic, their personal risk of infection or death, the 
legitimacy of related conspiracy theories, and trust in medical experts and their public 
health recommendations. Conservatives, when compared to liberals and moderates, see 
COVID-19 as less dangerous, and are more likely to share and interact with posts 
showcasing COVID-19 conspiracy theories on social media sites such as Twitter (Shao 
and Hao 2020, Havey 2020). Consumption of conservative U.S. media (such as Breitbart 
and Fox News) has also been correlated with greater misperceptions regarding COVID-
19 and with greater belief in President Trump’s effectiveness in responding to the virus 
(Pennycook et al 2020). Political conservativism has also been found to be a strong 
predictor for non-compliance with social distancing measures (Rothgerber et al 2020).  
3. The Mediating Effect of Personal Experience? 
 While the powerful effect and high frequency of motivated reasoning in political 
evaluations is undeniable, there is some evidence that personal experiences may work to 
counteract these psychological tendencies in certain situations. The greatest breadth of 
research in this area has been performed on the effects of the economy on one’s political 
preferences, with some scholars arguing that personal economic conditions create an 
influential baseline for each individual voter (Weatherford 1983), others finding that 
more localized conditions at the state level – rather than the national – hold significance 
for vote choice (Books and Prysby 1999), and still others presenting evidence that there is 
no significant causal relationship in that direction (Bartels 2002). MacKuen, Erikson, and 




complicate the literature, arguing that the American electorate “anticipates the economic 
future and rewards or punishes the president for economic events before they happen” 
(597), utilizing current events and news reports as ingredients in their forecasts. As the 
above research shows, while many political scientists have taken the effects of the 
economy on politics to be a given, the evidence is decidedly much less clear, and even 
contradictory at times. 
 In Schlozman and Verba’s Injury to Insult (1979), however, the authors’ findings 
and message are far from ambiguous; in a study of the effect of personal experience with 
unemployment on social ideology and voting behavior, the findings are firm: the effects 
of personal experience are negligible. Expecting unemployed respondents to exhibit more 
critical beliefs towards the notion of equity in opportunities in America when compared 
to their employed counterparts, the authors discover no statistical differences, writing: 
“There seems to be disjunction between general views of the American economic system 
and specific experiences with that system” (155) and, “beliefs about social reality – about 
either opportunities for advancement or the class structure [of America] – seem relatively 
impermeable to the effects of personal experience” (156). Instead, in their analysis of the 
effects of personal experience on voting behavior, the authors come to a troubling 
conclusion: it is partisan identification and attitudes towards the concept of 
unemployment – rather than respondents’ own employment status – that is more 
predictive of relevant voting behavior, as opposed to the other way around (331). 
 Personal experiences go well beyond economic conditions, of course. Studies 




to or friends with a service member held “weak effects of the salience of the war as a 
political issue” (Lau, Brown, and Sears 1978), increased risk of being drafted – indicated 
by a low draft number – was significantly correlated with opposition to the war and 
support for immediate withdrawal (Bergan 2009). These findings would suggest that once 
someone was individually affected by the Vietnam War draft, their political preferences 
reflected this effect. However, among those whom were drafted, long-term political 
effects stemming from the experience have been found to be insignificant: while being 
drafted led to an increase in mild preferences for Republican candidates, this increase was 
most likely due to military service more generally, which has been shown to increase 
support for Republicans. Perhaps surprisingly, the findings suggest that being drafted for 
one of the most controversial wars in recent American history ultimately held little to no 
effect on individual political attitudes. (Deuchert, Huber, and Schelker 2019). 
 There are however, some concrete – if more limited – examples of the salient 
effects of personal experiences on political preferences. Interactions, and especially 
negative interactions, with the U.S. healthcare system have found to strongly influence 
political preferences regarding the government’s role in healthcare, potentially holding 
legitimate ramifications for voting behavior (Larsen 2020). Additionally, personal 
experience with crime and law enforcement have also been found to be immensely 
consequential for individuals’ evaluations of police conduct, performance, and fairness, 
as well as overall trust in government entities and subsequent likelihood to participate in 
democratic institutions (Orr and West 2007, Soss and Weaver 2017). Further, scholars 




can hold their elected officials accountable – though not always for things that these 
officials are truly responsible for. Researchers Achen and Bartels (2002, 2016), for 
example, found that a series of shark attacks in New Jersey was correlated with a notable 
decline in voter support for the incumbent president among affected communities, despite 
the president obviously having no control over the attacks.3 
 However, in terms of personal experience ultimately overriding existing biases – 
when the smoker decides to quit smoking altogether, in Festinger’s words – evidence of 
such behavior in the political realm is comparatively few and far between. The best case 
for the influence of personal experience on political preferences is made by Yotam 
Margalit (2013) in her analysis of the effect of personal hardship – particularly 
unemployment – on preferences for welfare policy during the Great Recession of 2008. 
With millions of unemployed Americans struggling to make ends meet, not unlike the 
COVID-19 era of the present, Margalit found a marked attitudinal shift among 
Republicans – even more so than Democrats – in favor of welfare programs if they had 
experienced personal hardship as a result of the economic downturn. Importantly, 
Margalit notes that this shift was ultimately “short lived, dissipating as individuals’ 
employment situations improved” (80). Nevertheless, Margalit offers the most notable 
evidence in support of the counterclaim of this study. 
4. Cognitive Dissonance in an Era of Extreme Partisan Polarization 
                                                        
3 It is important to note, however, that the findings in this study have been contested by Fowler and Hall 
(2016), who claim that this study was statistically flawed. However, other researchers have found that, in 
the case of the 2015 College Football Playoff National Championship, students from the opposing teams’ 
colleges had their approval ratings of President Obama shift as a result of the football game’s outcome; the 
losing college punished President Obama, while the winning college rewarded him, showing another 




 It is debatable, however, how relevant Margalit’s findings would be in the era of 
extreme partisan polarization in which we find ourselves today. Whilst partisan 
polarization is far from unique to current-day politics, it is a key culprit behind the 
widening gap between political opinions among Democrats and Republicans. While some 
academics disagree about its very existence among the American electorate – perhaps 
most notably Abramowitz (2008) and Fiorina (2008) – the general academic consensus 
seems to be that polarization is both present and influential in elections. Ramifications of 
increased polarization include declines in split-ticket voting, fewer truly “independent” 
voters, and noticeable drops in political ambivalence among the American electorate 
(Jacobson 2015, Smidt 2017). Partisan bias in political perceptions has been shown to 
lead to extremely polarized evaluations of political leaders and economic conditions 
(Bartels 2000, 2002, 2006), and partisans are also more likely to reward their own party 
for good economic performance and punish the opposing party for poor performance than 
they are to do the reverse (Lebo and Cassino 2007). Additionally, both unconscious and 
conscious bias in favor of one’s own political party has been found in overwhelming 
majorities of both Democrats and Republicans (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). Further 
evidence has shown that polarization has gone beyond mere disagreements over issue 
preferences; party members now express feelings of hate towards one another at record 
levels (Iyengar and Westwood 2015). This increase in “social distance” between parties 
has made party members even more reluctant to see the good in members of the 
opposition party, “[discriminating] to a degree that exceeds discrimination based on race” 




 Mounting evidence suggests that not only is partisan polarization – and all of its 
side-effects – here to stay, perhaps it is getting worse. Analysis of the two main political 
parties’ 2008 electorates revealed heightening geographic, racial, and ideological 
divisions forming between Democrats and Republicans (Abramowitz 2010). As the years 
under the Obama Administration passed, historic levels of party loyalty and straight 
ticket voting were observed (Abramowitz and Webster 2016). The 2016 presidential 
election in particular saw these partisan divisions come to a boiling point, with record 
levels of voting behavior informed by negative partisanship – when dislike of the 
opposing party is greater than the like for one’s own party – taking place, with 
researchers writing: 
“Large proportions of Democrats and Republicans now dislike the 
opposing party and its leaders more than they like their own party and 
its leaders. Dislike of the other side is so strong, in fact, that even when 
partisans have reservations about their own party’s candidate, they are 
very reluctant to cross party lines” (Abramowitz and McCoy 2019, 
147) 
This reluctance among voters to cross the political aisle is, perhaps, a natural 
result of voters becoming akin to “sports team members,” as Miller and Conover (2015) 
suggest, where partisans are more concerned with “preserving the status of their teams” 
than they are with acting as “thoughtful citizens participating in the political process for 




presidential approval ratings, the peaks of which have taken a precipitous drop beginning 
with President Obama, indicating increasing partisan polarization in recent years. 4,5 
 As a result of this era of unprecedented political partisanship, wherein one’s 
partisan identity has seemingly become intrinsically tied to their overall identity, the 
perfect breeding ground for lazy dissonance reduction via motivated reasoning has been 
created. Now more than ever, political partisans feel beholden to their party; biased 
researching and minimizing is more likely to take place than actual changing of political 
opinions, as the barriers against change have simply become more demanding due to the 
increasingly polarized political landscape. Due to observed phenomena such as 
increasing levels of negative partisanship, even those party members whom are 
dissatisfied with their own party’s candidates and their performances will still be unlikely 
to “swap teams.” And critically, as existing literature has indicated, it is unlikely that the 
effect of personal experience will be powerful enough to overcome the ever-increasing 
influence of political partisanship. 
                                                        
4 Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, which resulted in nearly 3,000 American lives being lost, 
there was a well-documented “rally around the flag” effect; President Bush’s approval rating shot to over 
90 percent – the highest documented approval rating of all time – with Democrats and Republicans alike 
exuding tremendous support for the president (Moore 2001). Nearly two decades later, the novel 
Coronavirus has claimed 550,000 American lives – approximately 400,000 during the Trump 
Administration (Crist 2021). Despite such unprecedented loss of life, former President Trump’s approval 
rating during the pandemic peaked at 49 percent, and President Biden (as of writing) at 57 percent, strongly 
suggesting that the “rally around the flag” effect is, perhaps, a relic of the past (Gallup 2020, Gallup 2021). 
5 Of note, 9/11 was particularly politically unifying and mobilizing due to (1) the symbolic importance of 
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, (2) the attacks taking place on a single day – as opposed to the 
COVID-19 pandemic posing an ongoing threat – and (3) the ability to blame a specific group of individuals 
(al-Qaeda) for the attack – as opposed to the “culprit” of the COVID-19 pandemic being a virus. To that 
final point, however, political leaders, including former President Trump, have made active efforts to blame 
China and the Chinese government for the pandemic, referring to the virus as the “Kung Flu,” for example 





 Using Qualtrics, 1044 respondents were surveyed in mid-March 2021. In addition 
to basic demographic questions, including respondent’s age, gender, race, education 
level, household income, and state of residence, respondents were also asked to self-
identify as Republican, Democrat, Independent, or Other. As past research has indicated, 
truly Independent voters in America are exceedingly rare, and, in practice. most 
Independents usually vote like typical party members (Jacobson 2015). Seeing as that is 
the case, respondents whom self-identified as Independent voters were subsequently 
asked if they “think of [themselves] as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party.” As 
for respondents whom self-identified as Republican or Democrat, these individuals were 
asked if they considered themselves “strong” or “not very strong” members of that party. 
Respondents were consequently grouped into four major partisan groups: Strong 
Democrats, Not Very Strong Democrats (inclusive of Independents whom thought of 
themselves as closer to the Democratic Party), Not Very Strong Republicans (inclusive of 
Independents whom thought of themselves as closer to the Republican Party), and Strong 
Republicans. These partisan groups served as one of two independent variables. 
 The second independent variable sought to measure respondents’ proximity to 
negative effects of COVID-19, including death, infection, and unemployment as a result 
of the virus and the pandemic. Regarding (1) death, respondents were asked (a) if they 
knew someone who had died from COVID-19 and (b) if they were related to someone 
who had died from COVID-19. Regarding (2) infection, respondents were asked (a) if 




someone who had tested positive for COVID-19, or (c) if they themselves had tested 
positive for COVID-19. To account for deficiencies in accessibility to testing – 
geographically, economically, or otherwise – as well reluctance towards getting tested – 
i.e. a person was highly symptomatic for COVID-19, therefore saw no point in securing a 
test to know for certain that they were infected – respondents were also asked if they 
knew someone, were related to someone, or they themselves were symptomatic for 
COVID-19, and suspected they were infected, but did not get tested or were unable to get 
tested. Finally, regarding (3) unemployment, respondents were asked (a) if they knew 
someone, (b) were related to someone, or (c) they themselves had been newly 
unemployed for any length of time since the beginning of the pandemic. 
 In order to quantify respondents’ proximities to negative effects of COVID-19, 
each respondent was assigned a “proximity” value ranging from 0 (very low proximity) 
to 12 (very high proximity), with each of the eight experiences to which respondents 
answered “Yes” resulting in a +1 to their proximity value, and with greater numerical 
weight (+1) given to experiences involving death, as well as experiences directly and 
personally affecting respondents – i.e. respondents themselves being infected and/or 
being unemployed. In addition to their assigned proximity value, respondents were also 
placed in three proximity groups: Low Proximity (received a score from 0 – 3), Medium 
Proximity (received a score of 4 – 8), and High Proximity (received a score of 9 – 12). 
 The survey included two major dependent variables: (1) respondent evaluations of 
former President Donald Trump’s governmental response to the COVID-19 pandemic, 




pandemic response. Respondent evaluations of President Trump’s COVID-19 response 
were measured on a 5-point satisfaction scale, ranging from “Very Unsatisfied” to “Very 
Satisfied.” Respondents were then asked how President Biden’s pandemic response 
would worsen or improve relative to President Trump’s response, once again measured 
on a 5-point scale, ranging from “Greatly Worsen” to “Greatly Improve.” Of important 
note, the question that respondents were asked was worded in an anticipatory manner, as 
the survey was intended to be distributed either prior to President Biden’s inauguration, 
or in his very first weeks in office. However, survey responses were ultimately gathered 
in mid-March, and thus respondents would have been able to give responses based on 
more current developments under the Biden administration, including widespread 







Given the consistent strength of partisan identification and partisanship found in 
existing studies, as well as the less consistent effects of personal experience, there are two 
main hypotheses regarding the relationship between the two independent variables and 
two dependent variables: 
1. Republicans will be substantially more favorable towards President Trump’s 
COVID-19 response when compared to Democrats, and this will hold true across 
all levels of proximity to negative effects of COVID-19. 
2. Democrats will be substantially more positive in their anticipatory ratings of 
President Biden’s COVID-19 response when compared to Republicans, and this 
will hold true across all levels of proximity to negative effects of COVID-19. 
3. When compared with respondents’ partisan group, proximity to negative effects 
of COVID-19 will only be weakly correlated with evaluations of President Trump 






 Among the surveyed population, there was a skew towards Democrats; there were 
151 Strong Republicans (14.5%), 204 Weak Republicans (19.5%), 288 Weak Democrats 
(27.6%), 378 Strong Democrats (36.2%), and 23 respondents whom selected “Other” 
(2.2%) and subsequently could not be accurately placed in the four main partisan 
categories. 
Likewise, there was also a skew towards lower proximity scores, with 230 
respondents (22%) receiving proximity scores of 0. In total, 537 respondents (51.4%) 
were placed in the Low Proximity group, 385 (36.9%) in Medium Proximity, and 122 
(11.7%) in High Proximity. Table 1 displays the frequency at which respondents reported 
experiencing each type of negative effect of COVID-19, showcasing the eye-opening 
extent to which negative effects of COVID-19 were felt among the sample population. 





Table 1: Frequency of Negative Experiences with COVID-19 
Experience Yes No 
Knew someone who tested 
positive for or suspected 







Are related to someone who 
tested positive for or 








Respondent tested positive 
for COVID-19 or suspected 













Are related to someone who 






Knew someone who became 







Are related to someone who 
became newly unemployed 






Respondent became newly 







Average evaluation scores for President Trump’s COVID-19 response were 
compared across the four partisan groups (Figure 2). As anticipated, the survey results 
show distinct partisan divisions, with the average Strong Republican falling between 
“Neither Satisfied nor Unsatisfied” and “Satisfied” (average score of 2.695), the average 
Weak Republican falling into the former camp (average score of 2.186), and both the 
average Weak and Strong Democrats indicating that they were “Unsatisfied” (average 





Figure 2: Satisfaction with President Trump’s COVID-19 Response, By Party ID 
 






Also as anticipated, average anticipatory scores for President Biden’s COVID-19 
response displayed a completely inverted relationship across the four partisan groups 
(Figure 3). The average Strong Republican fell between anticipating that the government 
response would “Worsen” or “Neither Worsen nor Improve” (average score of 1.387), 
and the average Weak Republican resolutely responded with the latter (average score of 
1.971). Conversely, Weak and Strong Democrats were more optimistic, with their 
average responses being “Improve” (average scores of 2.763 and 3.155, respectively). 
When comparing average satisfaction scores for President Trump’s COVID-19 
response across proximity scores, however, there is not a similarly clear, apparent 
relationship between the two variables (Figure 4). If anything, there is a slight increase in 
respondents’ level of satisfaction with President Trump’s COVID-19 response as their 
proximity to negative effects of COVID-19 worsens – the opposite result of what one 
would expect if negative experiences with COVID-19 were influencing evaluations of the 
president that oversaw the vast majority of the pandemic response at the time of survey 
distribution; under those assumptions, increased proximity should be correlated with 
more negative evaluations, rather than more positive. Comparing average anticipatory 
scores for President Biden’s COVID-19 response across proximity scores, on the other 
hand, does yield a slight downward trend in anticipatory evaluations as proximity to 
negative effects of COVID-19 increases (Figure 5). 
In order to substantiate these claims of insignificance or significance, a bivariate 
regression was run to determine the direction and strength of the relationship between the 




Figure 4: Satisfaction with President Trump’s COVID-19 Response, By Proximity Value 
 






satisfaction and proximity to negative effects of COVID-19 does not output a statistically 
significant relationship, while the Biden regression does, and in the negative direction. 
These preliminary results point to an interesting phenomenon observed in the data: those 
who have been most negatively affected by COVID-19 seem to only hold the current 
president accountable. 
Table 2: Bivariate regression results for the relationship between proximity value and satisfaction with 
President Trump’s COVID-19 response. 
Variable Trump Evaluation Estimate 
Proximity Value of 0 (Intercept) 1.47439*** 
(0.06776) 
 










Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. 
***p < 0.001 
 
Table 3: Bivariate regression results for the relationship between proximity value and anticipatory evaluations 
of President Biden’s COVID-19 response. 
Variable Biden Anticipatory Evaluation Estimate 
Proximity Value of 0 (Intercept) 2.62865*** 
(0.0612) 
 










Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. 
***p < 0.001, *p<0.05 
 
Up to this point in the analysis, each independent variable’s effect on the 




variable. Without controlling for other variables (i.e. education, race, etc.) a mean 
comparison was performed for respondents belonging to each party within each 
proximity group (Figures 6 & 7). The results suggest strong support for all three 
hypotheses; Democrats are substantially less satisfied with Trump and substantially more 
optimistic for Biden when compared to Republicans, and this holds true for all levels of 
proximity. Once again, the strength and consistency of effects of personal experience pale 
in comparison to the effects of respondents’ partisan group. 
Figure 6: Satisfaction with President Trump’s COVID-19 Response, By Proximity Group & Party 
 
Puzzlingly, proximity seems to hold little – if any – effect on Republican 
respondents across both evaluations, with average responses for each dependent variable 
among Republican party members remaining almost nearly constant. Average responses 
among members of both parties remain virtually unchanged between members of the 




Figure 7: Expected Change to COVID-19 Response Under President Biden, By Proximity Group & Party 
 
High Proximity Democrats.6 
While interesting, these results are not consistent with the main counterclaim to 
this study’s hypotheses; if personal experience matters, increased proximity should result 
in more negative evaluations of the political leader that is more culpable of the degree of 
widespread severity of the effects of the pandemic: President Trump. The main 
counterclaim to this study rests upon the assumption that ordinary people will learn from 
their personal experiences and use them to inform their political opinions; low proximity 
will translate to higher evaluations, high proximity to lower evaluations. Beyond the fact 
that this relationship is only observed among High Proximity Democrats, and therefore 
does not apply to the vast majority of respondents in this study, this subgroup of 
                                                        
6 However, given the relatively small size of the High Proximity population (n=122, 85 Democrats, 25 
Republicans, and 2 “Others”) in comparison to the overall sample, further, more robust, statistical analysis 




respondents punishes President Biden, but rewards President Trump. Critically, the role 
of the political leader here is much different than the president in Achen and Bartels’ 
(2002) shark attack study; the President of the United States wields significant influence 
over how the government responds to a crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic. While 
President Trump’s pandemic response was characterized by downplaying the severity of 
the virus, falsely blaming increasing documented infection rates solely upon increased 
testing rates, touting use of unapproved treatments for COVID-19 (such as 
hydroxychloroquine), discouraging the wearing of face masks, and publically disagreeing 
with the advice of leading medical experts, President Biden’s pandemic response has 
been defined by trusting in the advice of medical experts, encouraging the wearing of 
masks, and – with recent finalized developments of COVID-19 vaccines – encouraging 
Americans to get vaccinated (Kates et al 2020). The government responses led by these 
two presidents differ principally in their trust and reliance on expert medical advice (as 
well as their duration: President Trump oversaw a year of the government’s pandemic 
response while President Biden had only been in power for less than two months at the 
time of survey distribution) – and, unfortunately, the Trump Administration’s approach 
held very real ramifications in terms of loss of life and viral spread, especially at the 
beginning of the pandemic. As it pertains to this study, the question that remains is 
simple: to the extent that respondents hold the president accountable for their negative 
experiences with COVID-19 – which is not much – do they hold the most culpable leader 




To more accurately quantify each independent variables’ effects, two multivariate 
regression analyses were performed, additionally controlling for respondents’ income 
level, race and ethnicity, and highest level of education (Tables 4 & 5).7 The results 
provide additional validity for the preliminary mean comparison and bivariate analyses. 
In analyses of each dependent variable, respondents’ partisan group maintains a strongly 
statistically significant, constant effect in the expected direction, and is by far the most 
influential variable in the model. In the case of evaluations of President Trump’s 
pandemic response, respondents become more critical as their partisan grouping shifts 
from more strongly Republican to more strongly Democrat, with the opposite effect 
observed regarding the Biden variable, once again providing strong support for all 
hypotheses. 
As opposed to the constant, intense effect of respondents’ partisan group on the 
two dependent variables, just as was observed among all previous analyses, neither the 
direction nor the strength of the effect of increases in proximity value is constant – or 
even similar – across the two dependent variables. Respondents whom have been more 
negatively affected by COVID-19 are less critical of Trump and more critical of Biden, 
both of which were found to be statistically significant correlations. Even in the case of 
the Biden variable, for which increases in proximity held a negative effect on evaluations, 
the approximate difference in magnitude of association (on a 0 - 4 scale) between  
                                                        
7 While it is generally accepted as good practice to control for race, it is a well-documented phenomenon 
that preferences of People of Color – particularly Black people – lean towards the Democratic Party. Thus, 
it is possible that race and ethnicity may have an effect on a key independent variable: Partisan ID. To 
account for this possibility, additional multivariate regressions were run without controlling for race; the 




Table 4: Multivariate regression model output for: “How satisfied are you with President Donald Trump’s 
governmental response to the COVID-19 pandemic?” 
 
Variable Trump Evaluation Estimate 
Strong Republican, Less than HS, Less 






Proximity Value 0.03638** 
(0.0123) 
 
Weak Republican -0.47735*** 
(0.14122) 
 
Weak Democrat -1.57911*** 
(0.13307) 
 
Strong Democrat -1.69489*** 
(0.12787) 
 
High School Degree 0.08207 
(0.24134) 
 
Some College -0.05806 
(0.2405) 
 
Bachelor’s Degree 0.02213 
(0.2405) 
 
Master’s Degree 0.41397 
(0.2491) 
 
Income of $25,000 - $50,000 0.02724 
(0.12353) 
 
Income of $50,000 - $100,000 0.05268 
(0.12078) 
 
Income of at least $100,000 -0.14404 
(0.13880) 
 












Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. 





Table 5: Multivariate regression model output for: “How do you anticipate the government’s COVID-19 
response to change under President Biden, beginning in late January 2021?” 
Variable Biden Anticipatory Evaluation Estimate 
Strong Republican, Less than HS, Less 






Proximity Value -0.05293*** 
(0.01062) 
 
Weak Republican 0.54687*** 
(0.12163) 
 
Weak Democrat 1.36999*** 
(0.11476) 
 
Strong Democrat 1.8002*** 
(0.11031) 
 
High School Degree 0.53706** 
(0.20753) 
 
Some College 0.67434** 
(0.20691) 
 
Bachelor’s Degree 0.77222*** 
(0.20681) 
 
Master’s Degree 0.80547*** 
(0.21428) 
 
Income of $25,000 - $50,000 0.09395 
(0.1064) 
 
Income of $50,000 - $100,000 0.06529 
(0.10406) 
 
Income of at least $100,000 0.24393 
(0.11964) 
 












Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. 




respondents who have experienced no measured negative effect from COVID-19 and 
every single measured effect of COVID-19 is only 0.6352 points – less than half of the 
difference in magnitude of association between Strong Republicans and Weak 
Democrats, and roughly a third of the difference in magnitude of association between 
Strong Republicans and Strong Democrats. 
In other words, the difference in magnitude of association between an unaffected 
respondent and a respondent whom (1) knows at least one person who has tested positive 
for COVID-19 or suspected they had the virus, (2) is related to at least one of these 
people, (3) knows at least one person who has died from COVID-19, (4) is related to at 
least one person who has died from COVID-19, (5) has caught (or suspected that they 
caught) COVID-19 themselves, (6) knows at least one person who has become 
unemployed during the pandemic, (7) is related to at least one of these people, (8) and 
has personally become newly unemployed during the pandemic is still only a third of a 
size of the difference in magnitude of association between two opposing loyal partisans. 
Once again revealed by the data, it is partisanship – rather than likely traumatic personal 
experiences with COVID-19 – that overwhelmingly informs respondents’ evaluations. 
Additionally, notable correlation is found in increases to respondents’ highest completed 
education level, with the data showing a statistically significant, positive, near-linear 
relationship between education and anticipatory evaluations of the Biden pandemic 
response. 
 Consistent with previous analyses, the multivariate regression results for Trump 




additional evidence that past presidents are not held responsible for their actions (or 
inaction), and instead foot the bill to their successors. The results reveal that for every 
single point increase in proximity score, respondents became more satisfied with 
President Trump’s pandemic response (on a 0 - 4 scale) by 0.0364 points, a statistically 
significant result.8 As aforementioned, this result reveals that those respondents whom 
have been most affected by COVID-19 in terms of the measures of this study are 
rewarding the president that is most liable for their having experienced those negative 
effects in the first place, and punishing the president that has, particularly by comparison, 
been very successful in reducing hospitalizations, deaths, and vaccine manufacturing and 
distribution.9 Thus, while political partisanship was found to explain the overwhelming 
majority of the observed variation among the dependent variables, the strength of the 
effect of personal experience with negative effects of COVID-19 was not only dwarfed in 
comparison, its effects were not uniform across both dependent variables – and in fact 
showed that respondents rewarded and punished presidents based on recency rather than 
the effectiveness of their pandemic response. Above all else, party, rather than personal 
experience – even some of the most traumatic experiences imaginable – inform 
respondents’ relevant political evaluations. 
 In addition to the study’s main dependent variables, respondents were also asked 
questions aimed to estimate their trust in experts and science, as well as questions that 
                                                        
8 Importantly, this observed effect is extremely weak compared to the effect of respondents’ partisan group; 
the maximum effect of proximity score on Trump evaluations would be an increase in favorability of 
0.4366 points, smaller than the difference of magnitude of association between Strong and Weak 
Republicans (-0.4774 points)! 
9 This study did not ask respondents when they experienced each negative effect of COVID-19. However, 
the vast majority of deaths, infections, and instances of job loss in the U.S. occurred under the Trump 




quantified respondents’ level of support for a national mask mandate, and respondents’ 
overall fear of the COVID-19 virus and pandemic.10 Multivariate regression analyses 
were employed to determine the existence, strength, and direction of the relationship 
between multiple variables (including controls) – partisan group, proximity value, 
education, income level, and race – and these additional measures.11 The results were 
striking, offering a glimpse at the sweeping influence of partisan identities on less 
obviously relevant preferences among respondents, as well as the weak and/or seemingly 
contradictory effect of increased proximity to negative effects of COVID-19 on those 
same preferences (Tables 6 – 10).  
For the three measures of trust in experts and science, respondents’ partisan 
group, again, was found to have a powerful and statistically significant correlation, 
though Weak Republican responses were not found to significantly statistically differ 
from Strong Republican responses in two of the three measures. Weak Democrats and 
Strong Democrats differed significantly from their Republican counterparts, indicating 
notably higher levels of trust in experts and science across all measures. Shockingly,  
 
 
                                                        
10 In order to quantify respondents’ trust in experts and science, three relevant survey questions were 
borrowed from Oliver and Rahn (2016). Responses were placed on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 
“Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.” Exact question wording can be found in the Appendix, Q25-27. 
11 In 4 of 5 of these additional analyses, a respondents’ race and ethnicity being something other than White 
Non-Hispanic was significantly correlated with greater distrust in science and experts and/or decreased fear 
of the pandemic and virus. Existing research has revealed similar observations; Martinez et al (2017), for 
example, found that Black study participants exhibited distrust and suspicion towards clinical trials and 
medical care. Potential explanations, according to the researchers, may lie in “systemic 
oppression…including exploitation, violence, and cultural imperialism [that] have contributed to the black 




Table 6: Multivariate regression model output for: “Please indicate your level of agreement with the following 
statement: I’d rather put my trust in the wisdom of ordinary people than the opinions of experts and 
intellectuals.” 
Variable Estimate 
Strong Republican, Less than HS, Less 






Proximity Value 0.01794 
(0.01035) 
 
Weak Republican -0.18513 
(0.1191) 
 
Weak Democrat -0.45382*** 
(0.11225) 
 
Strong Democrat -0.35019** 
(0.10786) 
 
High School Degree 0.19764 
(0.20315) 
 
Some College -0.06011 
(0.20237) 
 
Bachelor’s Degree -0.01897 
(0.2024) 
 
Master’s Degree 0.06319 
(0.20962) 
 
Income of $25,000 - $50,000 -0.23733* 
(0.10396) 
 
Income of $50,000 - $100,000 -0.1062 
(0.10171) 
 
Income of at least $100,000 -0.24404* 
(0.11684) 
 












Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. 





Table 7: Multivariate regression model output for: “Please indicate your level of agreement with the following 
statement: When it comes to really important questions, scientific facts don’t help very much.” 
Variable Estimate 
Strong Republican, Less than HS, Less 






Proximity Value 0.03974*** 
(0.0108) 
 
Weak Republican -0.27418* 
(0.12366) 
 
Weak Democrat -0.59397*** 
(0.11666) 
 
Strong Democrat -0.38595*** 
(0.11187) 
 
High School Degree -0.17239 
(0.21144) 
 
Some College -0.33461 
(0.21057) 
 
Bachelor’s Degree -0.34684 
(0.21062) 
 
Master’s Degree -0.0933 
(0.21809) 
 
Income of $25,000 - $50,000 0.02709 
(0.10825) 
 
Income of $50,000 - $100,000 -0.08383 
(0.10576) 
 
Income of at least $100,000 -0.13192 
(0.12151) 
 












Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. 





Table 8: Multivariate regression model output for: “Please indicate your level of agreement with the following 
statement: Ordinary people can really use the help of experts to understand complicated things like science and 
health.” 
Variable Estimate 
Strong Republican, Less than HS, Less 






Proximity Value -0.009391 
(0.009753) 
 
Weak Republican 0.113555 
(0.112017) 
 
Weak Democrat 0.34639** 
(0.105556) 
 
Strong Democrat 0.407953*** 
(0.101341) 
 
High School Degree 0.083462 
(0.191434) 
 
Some College -0.055584 
(0.19074) 
 
Bachelor’s Degree 0.143989 
(0.190763) 
 
Master’s Degree 0.036874 
(0.197542) 
 
Income of $25,000 - $50,000 0.034673 
(0.097983) 
 
Income of $50,000 - $100,000 0.070957 
(0.095707) 
 
Income of at least $100,000 0.086261 
(0.110044) 
 












Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. 





Table 9: Multivariate regression model output for: “Please indicate your degree of support for a national mask 
mandate.” 
Variable Estimate 
Strong Republican, Less than HS, Less 






Proximity Value -0.02012 
(0.01164) 
 
Weak Republican 0.28561* 
(0.13342) 
 
Weak Democrat 0.84225*** 
(0.1258) 
 
Strong Democrat 1.02922*** 
(0.12097) 
 
High School Degree 0.614** 
(0.22813) 
 
Some College 0.60957** 
(0.22723) 
 
Bachelor’s Degree 0.71119** 
(0.22725) 
 
Master’s Degree 0.54913* 
(0.23541) 
 
Income of $25,000 - $50,000 -0.13657 
(0.11681) 
 
Income of $50,000 - $100,000 -0.0336 
(0.11427) 
 
Income of at least $100,000 -0.03225 
(0.13127) 
 












Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. 





Table 10: Multivariate regression model output for: “How worried are you about the COVID-19 virus and 
pandemic?” 
Variable Estimate 
Strong Republican, Less than HS, Less 






Proximity Value 0.003025 
(0.011255) 
 
Weak Republican 0.169635 
(0.12944) 
 
Weak Democrat 0.617601*** 
(0.12215) 
 
Strong Democrat 0.729927*** 
(0.11729) 
 
High School Degree 0.368813 
(0.220799) 
 
Some College 0.378049 
(0.220162) 
 
Bachelor’s Degree 0.465678* 
(0.220088) 
 
Master’s Degree 0.343498 
(0.227938) 
 
Income of $25,000 - $50,000 0.025253 
(0.11338) 
 
Income of $50,000 - $100,000 0.031169 
(0.110652) 
 
Income of at least $100,000 0.021293 
(0.127081) 
 












Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. 





education was found to have no statistically significant correlation with any of the three 
measures, as was the case for increased proximity scores for two of the three measures. 
Increased proximity scores did have a statistically significant correlation with one 
measure of trust in science, but a higher proximity value was correlated with greater 
distrust in science (Table 7).12 As these results suggest, it is respondents’ partisan 
identities – rather than their level of education or negative personal experience with a 
medical and humanitarian disaster – that guide their trust in science and experts, 
providing further support for the earlier claim of anti-science political rhetoric from 
Republican leaders holding very real ramifications for preferences among their 
supporters. And, to the extent which increased proximity holds any effect, such negative 
experiences actually push people away from the very science meant to prevent similar 
experiences from continuing to plague the American people. 
Analysis of responses to measurements of support for a national mask mandate 
and level of fear regarding the pandemic paint a similar picture (Tables 9 & 10). Once 
again, respondents’ partisan group proves to be highly correlated with their responses to 
both measurement questions, with a statistical chasm forming between Republicans and 
Democrats – the former group being much more strongly opposed to a mask mandate and 
much less worried about the virus and pandemic. Regarding support for the mask 
mandate, education does present a positive, statistically significant correlation, though no 
such relationship exists regarding fear of the pandemic. Absent of any statistical 
                                                        
12 The measure in question was as follows: “Please indicate your level of agreement with the following 
statement: When it comes to really important questions, scientific facts don’t help very much.” Higher 




significance in either direction, however, is increased proximity score. Once again, it is 
partisan identity, rather than personal experience, that is much more significantly 
correlated with support for a policy that would enforce a common-sense public health 
practice and prevent the spread of COVID-19, as well as with respondents’ level of worry 
regarding the pandemic. As the data suggests, to have endured sickness, death of loved 
ones, and rampant unemployment due to COVID-19 does not significantly factor into 





DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 This study sought to determine if personal experience with negative effects of 
COVID-19 was substantially correlated with evaluations of the president, and how this 
correlation compared to the effect of respondents’ partisan group on those same 
evaluations. Not only was personal experience found to be only weakly correlated with 
evaluations of these political leaders when compared to the consistently massive 
correlation of respondents’ partisan group, this correlation was repeatedly found to not 
align with the directionality one would expect if negative experiences were producing 
negative evaluations of culpable political leaders. Instead, high proximity respondents 
appeared to reward President Trump – who, at the time of survey distribution, had been 
president for roughly 85 percent of the pandemic, during which approximately 400,000 
Americans died due to COVID-19 and the vast majority of infections and instances of job 
loss occurred – and punish President Biden – who, at the time of survey distribution, had 
been in power for less than two months, during which approximately 150,000 Americans 
had died – while simultaneously hospitalizations and infection rates stalled or declined – 
and was well on his way towards delivering on and exceeding his campaign promise of 
100 million vaccination shots in his first 100 days in office. 
Thus, to the extent that personal experience informs political preferences, this 
effect is neither strong, nor consistent across leaders, nor does this accountability seem to 
be correlated with culpability. Rather, respondents’ political evaluations can 
overwhelmingly be attributed to their partisan group as opposed to their exposure to loss 




having substantial control over the competence of the governmental response meant to 
prevent such harrowing experiences. 
Additional analyses performed on secondary dependent variables further bolstered 
the legitimacy of these findings. When analyzing variability in respondents’ trust in 
science and experts, it was respondents’ partisan identity – rather than personal 
experience with negative effects of COVID-19 nor respondents’ education level – that 
ultimately was statistically correlated with trust; Democrats displayed significantly higher 
levels of trust when compared to their Republican counterparts. Increased proximity to 
negative effects of COVID-19 did have a statistically significant correlation with a single 
measure of trust in science, but a higher proximity value was found to be correlated with 
greater distrust, meaning that having such negative experiences actually has the effect of 
pushing Americans away from the science meant to prevent similar experiences from 
continuing to plague the country. 
Similar results were observed when analyzing variability in respondents’ support 
for a national mask mandate and fear of the pandemic and virus. Once again, it was found 
that the correlation of partisan identity – rather than personal experience with COVID-19 
nor education level (in the case of fear of the virus) – was strongly statistically 
significant, with Democrats signaling markedly higher support for a mask mandate and 
notably higher worry regarding the pandemic when compared to Republicans. These 
patterns may be a result of political messaging from GOP leaders such as former 
President Trump, whom downplayed the severity of the virus while in office, and 




affected by COVID-19 in terms of death of loved ones, potentially life-altering sickness, 
and economically devastating loss of employment means virtually nothing in terms of 
support for mandated mask-wearing – which would help curtail these experiences for 
millions of other Americans – nor fear of this virus, which has so deeply and negatively 
impacted many of these respondents. 
 While these findings may bode well for the validity of this study’s hypotheses, 
they do not instill confidence in the health of democratic accountability in America. In 
every single analysis performed, accountability on the basis of respondents’ lived 
experiences was either found to be completely insignificant, statistically weak, and/or 
inconsistent. Conversely, partisan identity was repeatedly found to hold intensely strong, 
consistent correlation with respondents’ answers among all dependent variables. 
If the American people, subconsciously or otherwise, do not use their own 
personal experiences to hold their political leaders responsible for their actions (or 
inaction) in the face of the greatest humanitarian disaster and epidemiological threat that 
this country has faced in recent history, and instead continue to treat politics as a “team 
game,” then it is safe to say that the bedrock of our democracy, democratic 
accountability, is facing an existential threat. Without proper accountability, political 
leaders have little incentive to serve the best interests of their constituents, and 
democratic representation becomes hardly representative. Consequently, should party 
continue to overwhelm personal experience, the very functioning of America’s 






Q11 What gender do you identify as? 
o Male  (1)  
o Female  (2)  
o Non-binary / third gender / other  (3)  
o Prefer not to say  (4)  
 
Q12 What is your age? 
o Under 18  (1)  
o 18 - 24  (2)  
o 25 - 34  (3)  
o 35 - 44  (4)  
o 45 - 54  (5)  
o 55 - 64  (6)  
o 65 years or older  (7)  
 








Q13 What racial group best describes you?  
o White  (4)  
o Black or African American  (5)  
o Asian American  (6)  
o Native American  (7)  
o Other  (8) ________________________________________________ 
 
Q62 Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin? 
o No, not of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin  (4)  
o Yes, Mexican, Mexican American, Chicano  (5)  
o Yes, Puerto Rican  (6)  
o Yes, Cuban  (7)  
o Yes, another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin  (8)  
 
Q14 What is the highest degree or level of education you have completed? 
o Some High School  (1)  
o High School  (2)  
o Some College  (3)  
o College  (4)  






Q15 What is your annual household income? 
o Less than $25,000  (1)  
o $25,000 - $50,000  (2)  
o $50,000 - $100,000  (3)  
o More than $100,000  (4)  
 
Q21 In which state do you currently reside? 
Alabama (1) ... I do not reside in the United States (53) 
 
Q25 Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statement: I’d rather put 
my trust in the wisdom of ordinary people than the opinions of experts and intellectuals. 
o Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Neither Agree nor Disagree  (3)  
o Agree  (4)  









Q26 Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statement: When it comes 
to really important questions, scientific facts don’t help very much. 
o Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Agree  (4)  
o Strongly Agree  (5)  
 
Q27 Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statement: Ordinary 
people can really use the help of experts to understand complicated things like science 
and health. 
o Strongly Disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (3)  
o Agree  (4)  









Q19 Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
Independent, or what? 
o Republican  (1)  
o Democrat  (2)  
o Independent  (3)  
o Other (Please Specify)  (4)  
 
Display This Question: 
If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
Independent, or what? = Independent 
 
Q22 Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party? 
o Closer to the Republican Party  (1)  
o Closer to the Democratic Party  (2)  
 
Display This Question: 
If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
Independent, or what? = Republican 
 
Q23 Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican? 
o Strong Republican  (1)  




Display This Question: 
If Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
Independent, or what? = Democrat 
 
Q24 Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat? 
o Strong Democrat  (1)  
o Not Very Strong Democrat  (2)  
 
Q28 Do you know someone who has tested positive for COVID-19? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
Q29 Do you know someone who has shown symptoms of COVID-19, and whom 
suspected they were infected, but did not get tested or was unable to get tested? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
Q30 Are you related to someone who has tested positive for COVID-19? 
o Yes  (1)  





Q31 Are you related to someone who has shown symptoms of COVID-19, and whom 
suspected they were infected, but did not get tested or was unable to get tested? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)   
 
Q32 Do you know someone who has died from COVID-19? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
Q33 Are you related to someone who has died from COVID-19? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
Q34 Have you tested positive for COVID-19? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
Q35 Have you shown symptoms of COVID-19, and suspected you were infected, but did 
not get tested or were unable to get tested? 
o Yes  (1)  




Q37 Do you know someone who has been newly unemployed for any length of time 
since the beginning of the pandemic (approximately February/March 2020)? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
Q38 Are you related to someone who has been newly unemployed for any length of time 
since the beginning of the pandemic (approximately February/March 2020)? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
Q39 Have you been newly unemployed for any length of time since the beginning of the 
pandemic (approximately February/March 2020)? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
Q40 How satisfied are you with President Donald Trump’s governmental response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic? 
o Very Unsatisfied  (1)  
o Unsatisfied  (2)  
o Neither unsatisfied nor satisfied  (3)  
o Satisfied  (4)  




Q41 How do you anticipate the government’s COVID-19 response to change under 
President Biden, beginning in late January 2021? 
o Greatly Worsen  (1)  
o Worsen  (2)  
o Remain the same  (3)  
o Improve  (4)  
o Greatly Improve  (5)  
 
Q42 Please indicate your degree of support for a national mask mandate. 
o Strongly Oppose  (1)  
o Oppose  (2)  
o Neither oppose nor support  (3)  
o Support  (4)  
o Strongly Support  (5)  
 
Q43 How worried are you about the COVID-19 virus and pandemic? 
o Not Worried at All  (1)  
o Fairly Unworried  (2)  
o Neither worried nor unworried  (3)  
o Fairly Worried  (4)  
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